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Inhibitory control can be triggered directly via the retrieval of previously acquired stimulus-
stop associations from memory. However, a recent study suggests that this item-specific 
stop learning may be mediated via expectancies of the contingencies in play (Best, Lawrence, 
Logan, McLaren, & Verbruggen, 2016). This could indicate that stimulus-stop learning also 
induces strategic proactive changes in performance. We further tested this hypothesis in the 
present study. In addition to measuring expectancies following task completion, we introduced 
a between-subjects expectancy manipulation in which one group of participants were informed 
about the stimulus-stop contingencies and another group did not receive any information about 
the stimulus-stop contingencies. Moreover, we combined this instruction manipulation with a 
distractor manipulation that was previously used to examine strategic proactive adjustments. 
We found that the stop-associated items slowed responding in both conditions. Furthermore, 
participants in both conditions generated expectancies following task completion that were 
consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies. The distractor manipulation was ineffective. 
However, we found differences in the relationship between the expectancy ratings and task 
performance: in the instructed condition, the expectancies reliably correlated with the response 
slowing for the stop-associated items, whereas in the uninstructed condition we found no reliable 
correlation. These differences between the correlations were reliable, and our conclusions were 
further supported by Bayesian analyses. We conclude that stimulus-stop associations that are 
acquired either via task instructions or via task practice have similar effects on behaviour but 
could differ in how they elicit response slowing. 
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‘Response inhibition’ is often considered to be one of the core executive control functions, and the  concept 
has been linked to flexible and adaptive behaviour in healthy and clinical populations (e.g. Chambers, 
 Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Miyake et al., 2000; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 
2004;  Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). However, our previous work suggests that stopping in go/no-go and 
stop-signal tasks can be ‘automatically’ triggered by the retrieval of instances or episodes from memory 
 (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b; for a review, see Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014), with-
out much involvement of ‘top-down’ control mechanisms. 
In the go/no-go paradigm, participants respond when a go stimulus is presented and withhold their 
response when a no-go stimulus is presented. In the stop-signal paradigm, participants usually perform a 
choice reaction-time task on no-signal trials; on a random selection of trials, a stop signal (e.g. an auditory 
tone or an extra visual cue) is presented after a variable delay (stop-signal delay; SSD) which instructs par-
ticipants to withhold their response to the go stimulus. Several studies have manipulated the consistency of 
the mapping between specific stimuli and stopping in these response-inhibition tasks. These studies have 
demonstrated that, following a training phase, responding is typically slower for old stop-associated stimuli 
compared with consistent go stimuli (always presented on no-signal trials), inconsistent stimuli (presented 
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on no-signal and stop-signal trials with equal probability), or new stimuli (not previously presented; e.g. 
Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren, Verbruggen, 2016; Bowditch, Verbruggen & McLaren, 2016; Chiu, Aron, & 
Verbruggen, 2012; Liefooghe, Degryse, Theeuwes, 2016; Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008b). At least in some paradigms, this slowing can be attributed to the retrieval of associations between 
specific stimuli and the stop ‘goal’ or ‘response’, such that the stimulus (e.g. ‘apple’) or stimulus category (e.g. 
‘fruit’) becomes associated with stopping (cf. Logan, 1988). When the stimulus (or category) is repeated, the 
stimulus-stop association is retrieved, interfering with responding on no-signal trials. Thus, response inhibi-
tion is not necessarily an entirely instruction-based (e.g. ‘stop when an extra signal occurs’) act of executive 
control, it can also be triggered by the direct retrieval of a ‘stop response’ from memory (even when it is not 
required or intended at a given moment). 
The ‘automatic1 inhibition’ account states that after stimulus-specific stop training the need for rule- or 
instruction-based control is reduced and may eventually disappear altogether as control is triggered ‘bot-
tom-up’ following stimulus presentation (see also e.g. Chein & Schneider, 2012). In some situations, how-
ever, slowing for old stop words could also be caused by anticipatory processes. One of the main functions of 
the control system is biasing competition between stimulus or response options on the basis of expectancies 
or rules. When a certain action is predicted, for example, the motor network is pre-activated, biasing action 
selection and reducing the latency of the anticipated action (e.g. Bestmann, 2012; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; 
but see also Verbruggen, McAndrew, Weidemann, Stevens, & McLaren, 2016). Consistent with this idea, we 
recently found that response slowing for old stop-associated items may have been mediated via expectancies 
of the stimulus-stop contingencies in play (Best et al., 2016; Best & Verbruggen, under review). Following 
task completion, participants were required to rate how much they expected to withhold their response 
to each of the stimuli presented in the task. We found correlations between the expectancy ratings and 
response slowing in some of these experiments. This suggests that expectancies generated on the basis of 
the acquired stimulus-stop mappings may contribute to response slowing. After all, previous work shows 
that when instructions at the beginning of a block or a cue at the beginning of a trial indicate that a no-go 
or stop signal may appear, participants tend to proactively adjust attentional settings, increase response 
thresholds, or proactively suppress motor output to enhance detection of no-go or stop signals and prevent 
premature go responses (e.g. Aron, 2011; Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; Jahfari, Stinear, 
Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; Verbruggen, Stevens, & Chambers, 2014; 
Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, Neggers, Kahn, & Vink, 2012). Our expectancy results (Best et al., 2016) suggest that 
stop-associated items could become such stop cues (e.g. ‘if stimulus X then p(stop) is high’). In this case, the 
slowing observed for old stop-associated items could be due to deliberate and strategic proactive control 
adjustments of attentional, response-selection, or motor settings on go trials rather than suppression of 
motor output via the direct retrieval of stimulus-stop associations (i.e. stimulus X = stop). 
Evidence for the involvement of strategic proactive control adjustments in stop-training tasks would have 
two important implications. First, it would contradict the idea that inhibitory control is always fully ‘automa-
tised’ after practice in stop-training tasks. Second, it would have important practical implications as it could 
shed a new light on findings in the applied inhibition training domain. Studies of this type suggest that 
the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations could be an effective way to reduce engagement in impulsive 
and compulsive behaviours, such as excessive unhealthy food intake (e.g., Adams, Lawrence, Verbruggen, 
& Chambers, 2017; Houben, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 2011; Lawrence et al., 2015a, 2015b; Veling, Aarts, & 
Papies, 2011; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2012) and alcohol consumption (e.g., Houben, Nederkoorn, Wiers & 
Jansen, 2011; Jones & Field, 2013; for meta-analyses, see Allom, Mullan, & Hagger, 2015; Jones et al., 2016). 
Our previous expectancy findings (Best et al., 2016) indicate that the effects of inhibition training could be 
more strategic than initially thought. 
The ‘direct activation’ (i.e. the stop process is directly activated by the retrieval of stimulus-stop associa-
tions) and ‘strategic proactive adjustment’ (i.e. go processing is proactively adjusted when the probability of 
a stop signal is deemed high) accounts both predict increased reaction times (RTs) for old stop-associated 
items. One way to assess whether participants proactively adjust response strategies for old stop-associated 
items is to question them at the end of the experiment (as in Best et al., 2016). However, measuring knowl-
edge of rules, expectancies, or strategies at the end of the experiment has limitations (Newell & Shanks, 
2014; Shanks, 2010). Newell and Shanks (2014) proposed four criteria for the assessment of awareness: 
 1 ‘Automaticity’ in this account is defined on the basis of Instance Theory (Logan, 1988). In this theory, performance was considered 
to be ‘automatic’ when it was based on the retrieval of previous instances or episodes from memory. 
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(1) reliability (the assessment should not be affected by factors that did not also affect behavioural perfor-
mance); (2)  relevance (assessments should only target information relevant to the behaviour in question); 
(3) sensitivity (assessments should be made under optimal conditions, such as using the same cues as in 
the task); and (4) immediacy (the assessment should be made during behaviour or immediately afterwards). 
Whilst assessing expectancies at the end of task performance might meet the first three criteria, it is cer-
tainly sub-optimal that expectancies were obtained after learning had taken place. However, asking partici-
pants to provide an expectancy rating at the beginning of each trial (as in Best et al., 2016, Experiment 4) 
could change the nature of the task, and may ‘push’ participants towards strategic proactive adjustments in 
anticipation of a stop signal. Therefore, in the present study, we used a complementary approach to assess 
the contribution of strategic proactive adjustments that did not require participants to provide a trial-by-
trial expectancy rating. In addition to measuring expectancy ratings at the end of the experiment, we used a 
distractor manipulation to further determine how slowing to stop-associated items is achieved. 
Verbruggen, Stevens, and Chambers (2014) introduced perceptual (visual) distractors to measure reactive 
and (strategic) proactive control during performance of a stop-signal task. In their version of the task, there 
were three block types: central-signal blocks (a visual stop signal could occur in the centre of the screen), 
non-central signal blocks (a visual stop signal could occur in the periphery), and no-signal blocks (no stop 
signals could occur). Moreover, they presented random two-letter strings as visual distractors on a random 
50% of trials. This created a trade-off in non-central blocks: strategic proactive adjustments involved the wid-
ening of attentional focus to detect stop signals in the periphery whereas interference control required the 
narrowing of focus to avoid processing the distractors. These opposing demands produced a larger distractor 
effect2 on no-signal trials in non-central signal blocks than on no-signal trials in the two other block types. 
In the present study, we used the same non-central signals (i.e. visual stop signals that occurred in the 
periphery of the screen) and distractor manipulation (random two-letter strings) to examine if strategic 
proactive control adjustments were made for stop-associated items. We reasoned that if stop-associated 
items become cues for strategic proactive control adjustments, participants would proactively widen their 
attention in order to detect the stop signal in the periphery. As shown in Verbruggen, Stevens et al. (2014), 
widening of attention would, in turn, result in greater processing of the distractors and thus increase the 
size of the distractor effect (in analogy with the block-based differences observed in Verbruggen, Stevens, 
et al., 2014). In contrast, the ‘direct activation’ account does not predict a widening of attention as the stop-
associated items would directly activate the stop goal and so participants would not need to rely on the stop 
signal as a cue to stop their response. Thus, according to the ‘direct activation’ account, there would be no 
widening of attention and so no change in the size of the distractor effect between items consistently associ-
ated with stopping and items consistently associated with going or associated with both going and stopping.
A pilot study (reported in Supplementary Materials) showed that words frequently associated with stop-
ping did not display a larger distractor effect than words rarely or never associated with stopping. As noted 
in the previous paragraph, the ‘strategic proactive control adjustment’ account predicts that items fre-
quently associated with stopping should lead to a more pronounced widening of attention (as reflected 
by an increased distractor effect) compared with items never or rarely associated with stopping. There was 
no evidence of this data pattern in the pilot study. Thus, these findings argue against the ‘strategic proac-
tive control adjustment’ account. However, on the basis of the pilot study, it is not possible to determine 
whether participants did not make strategic proactive adjustments to their attention or whether the distrac-
tor manipulation did not detect such adjustments. In the main study, we therefore decided to combine the 
distractor manipulation (used in the pilot study) with a between-subjects instruction manipulation that was 
designed to increase strategic proactive control adjustments in one group of participants. In the ‘instructed’ 
group, participants were shown a list of the words frequently associated with stopping at the beginning 
of each block and were explicitly informed that these words were more likely to occur with a stop signal 
than other words in the task. The reasoning was that, if any strategic proactive control adjustments occur 
at all, they should be more pronounced in the instructed group (as measured by a larger distractor effect 
for these ‘stop-associated’ words) compared with another group that did not receive any information about 
the stop-associated words and so acquired these associations through task practice alone (as in the pilot 
study). In other words we expected that the stop-associated words in the instructed condition would act like 
instructed cues (as in other studies that examined strategic proactive adjustments; e.g. Aron, 2011; Elchlepp, 
Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Verbruggen & 
 2 Performance on distractor trials minus performance on no-distractor trials.
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Logan, 2009a; Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, Neggers, Kahn, & Vink, 2012). Thus, by contrasting performance in 
the instructed group with performance in an uninstructed group (in which participants were not told about 
the stimulus-stop contingencies) we could test how the acquisition of instructed and uninstructed stimulus-
stop contingencies influenced performance in a stop-signal task.
Furthermore, in addition to the instruction manipulation, we also obtained expectancy ratings at the end 
of the experiment (unlike in the pilot study). By comparing the correlation between these ratings and per-
formance in both conditions, we also hoped to find out more about how instructions and learning based on 
practice would influence performance.
The present study
In the present study, we manipulated task instructions and perceptual distractors to investigate how expec-
tancies influence learning in a stop-signal task and so distinguish the contributions of strategic proactive 
adjustments and the direct retrieval of the stop goal.
The main design 
On each trial, a large square and a fixation signal were presented in the middle of the screen (Figure 1). 
After a delay, a single word appeared in the centre of the square. Participants had to decide whether the 
word referred to a natural or a human-made object. On stop-signal trials, the lines of the surrounding square 
became thicker (i.e. the stop signal), instructing the participants to stop their response. There were three 
word types in this experiment: 80%-stop words (on 80% of trials where this particular word type was pre-
sented, a stop signal was presented); 20%-stop words (on 20% of trials where this particular word type was 
presented, a stop signal was presented); and 0%-stop words (only occurred on no-signal trials). The 80%-stop 
words, 20%-stop words, and 0%-stop words remained the same throughout the experiment.
Figure 1: The distractor stop task. A word was presented in the middle of a square. Participants had to judge 
whether the word referred to a natural or human-made object. On half of the trials (distractor trials), 
randomly generated two-letter strings appeared at random locations every 100 ms. On some trials (stop-
signal trials), the square turned bold after a variable delay from the onset of the word, instructing the par-
ticipants to stop their response. For display purposes, foreground and background colours are switched in 
this figure. In the present study, white stimuli appeared against a black background.
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To contrast the ‘direct activation’ and ‘strategic proactive adjustment’ accounts, we presented visual 
 distractors to determine if slowing was (at least partly) due to strategic proactive changes in attentional set-
tings. In addition, we directly manipulated contingency knowledge via task instructions (between-subjects). 
In the instructed condition, participants were presented with a list of the 80%-stop words at the beginning 
of each block; in the uninstructed condition, participants received no information about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies. In the instructed condition, participants received no information about the 20%-stop and 
0%-stop words, although it is possible that our instruction manipulation might have influenced more gen-
eral knowledge about the existence of associations within the task (Gaschler, Marewski, Wenke, & Frensch, 
2014). We return to this issue in the General Discussion. 
We also examined how performance changed across the task. Instruction following is implemented via a 
fast prefrontal (indirect) route that links stimuli and responses whereas practice-based learning would be 
implemented via a slower (direct) route that includes stimulus areas, response areas, and the basal ganglia 
(e.g. Chein & Schneider, 2012; Ramamoorthy & Verguts, 2012). Therefore we examined how performance 
changed over three experiment parts. 
The predictions 
We used a ‘triangulation’ approach to distinguish between the ‘direct activation’ and ‘strategic proactive 
adjustment’ accounts. 
First, we predicted that responding on no-signal trials would be slower and the probability of responding 
on stop-signal trials would be lower for the 80%-stop words compared with the other the word types in both 
the instructed and uninstructed conditions. Furthermore, if the 80%-stop words elicited extreme slowing 
or outright stopping we would detect this as a higher probability of missed responses on no-signal trials for 
the 80%-stop words than for the other word types. We further predicted that the slowing for the 80%-stop 
words would be especially pronounced in the instructed condition (as reflected in a reliable two-way interac-
tion between word type and condition). More pronounced slowing for the 80%-stop words in the instructed 
than in the non-instructed condition would provide a critical manipulation check that participants in the 
instructed condition used the instructed expectancies during task performance. 
Second, stimulus-stop learning does not seem to modulate attentional processes much when visuospatial 
stop signals are used (Best & Verbruggen, under review) whereas proactive control adjustments do seem 
to modulate attentional processes (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014; see also e.g. Elchlepp et al., 2016; 
Schevernels et al., 2015). Thus, we predicted that the distractor effect (as measured in RTs) would be larger 
for the 80%-stop words than for the other word types if participants made strategic proactive adjustments 
(similar to the non-central vs. control blocks in Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). As strategic proactive 
adjustments seemed more likely in the instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition, we also 
predicted a reliable three-way interaction between word type, condition, and distractor. Importantly, the 
absence of a reliable three-way interaction in combination with the presence of a reliable two-way interac-
tion between distractor and word type would indicate that strategic proactive adjustments were made in 
both instruction conditions. 
Third, we hypothesised that the slowing (or even outright stopping, as reflected in increased probability 
of missed responses on no-signal trials and decreased probability of responding on stop-signal trials) to the 
stop-associated words in the uninstructed condition would emerge with task practice. This would reflect the 
acquisition of the stimulus-stop associations through learning. In contrast, as participants in the instructed 
condition were shown a list of the words frequently associated with stopping at the beginning of each block, 
we predicted that slowing or outright stopping to the stop-associated items in the instructed condition 
would be present across task practice (but could get stronger across task practice if additional learning took 
place). Thus, we analysed how task performance changed across three parts. Importantly, if the difference 
between the instructed and uninstructed groups is only due to the rate of learning (as discussed above), our 
effects should also be modulated by part. More specifically, the effect of word type would differ in the two 
conditions at the beginning of the task but not towards the end of the task. 
Finally, at the end of the experiment, we obtained an expectancy rating for each of the words presented 
in the task. We predicted that participants would expect to stop more to the 80%-stop words than the other 
word types following task completion, especially in the instructed condition. This would reflect the acquisi-
tion of the stimulus-stop expectancies instructed at the beginning of each block in the instructed condition. 
We further hypothesised that the expectancy ratings would correlate with the slowing for the 80%-stop 
words during task performance in the instructed condition, showing the slowing to be driven (in part) by 
strategic adjustments to task performance on the basis of the acquisition or formation of expectancies. 
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Thus, a correlation between slowing for the 80%-stop words and expectancy would provide evidence for 
the ‘strategic proactive adjustment’ account. Since the ‘direct activation’ account predicts that slowing for 
the 80%-stop words would be driven by direct activation of the stop goal from memory, we hypothesised 
that there would be no correlation between the expectancy ratings and the slowing for the 80%-stop words 
in the uninstructed condition. However, if the 80%-stop words acted as similar stop expectancy ‘cues’, we 
should see a similar positive correlation in the uninstructed condition. 
Experiments 
There were two experiments. In Experiment 1, we encouraged fast responding using a strict response 
deadline (1250 ms). We also obtained eye-movement data as an additional dependent variable to detect 
within-trial shifts of attentional focus. However, the probability of missed no-signal responses (M = 0.050, 
SD = 0.066) was higher than in our previous study (Best et al., 2016), including for items that were not 
associated with stopping. This indicates that the response deadline was too strict. Therefore, we ran another 
experiment in which we extended the response deadline (2000 ms) to reduce the probability of missed 
responses. To ensure that the overall task duration was comparable across experiments, we did not obtain 
eye-movement data in Experiment 2. After all, the eye-movement data of Experiment 1 did not substan-
tially add to the information provided by the behavioural data (Supplementary Materials; this is consistent 
with Best & Verbruggen, under review; Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). Note that the overall study set-up 
remained the same.
Initial analyses revealed that whilst the probability of missed no-signal responses was reduced in 
Experiment 2 (and the no-signal reaction times numerically increased) the overall pattern of results (i.e. 
interactions between word types, distractor types, and instruction conditions) was consistent across both 
experiments. Therefore, we combined the data of both experiments as this increased the overall power (for 
completeness, we present the separate analyses for the experiments in the Supplementary Materials).
Method
Participants. 120 volunteers (48 in Experiment 1 and 72 in Experiment 2) from the University of Exeter 
participated for monetary compensation (£8) or partial course credit (M = 19.88 years, SD = 3.05, 98 females, 
109 right-handed). Two participants were replaced because the percentage of correct no-signal trials was 
below 70% (this exclusion criterion was based on our earlier pilot study; for details, see Supplementary 
Materials) and three participants in Experiment 1 were replaced due to poor calibration of the eye-tracker 
in one or more task blocks. 
The experiments were approved by the local research ethics committee (School of Psychology, University 
of Exeter). Each participant provided informed consent after the nature and possible consequences of the 
study was explained. The target sample size and exclusion criteria were decided in advance of data collection 
for each experiment to ensure that we had enough power (0.80) to detect small-to-medium sized effects 
(f = 0.20) in the word type by condition interactions. A power calculation was performed using G*Power 3.1 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to between-subjects groups.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiments were run using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). The stimuli 
were presented on a 17-in CRT monitor (screen size: 1024 × 768 pixels) in Experiment 1 and on a 21-in iMac 
(screen size: 1920 × 1080) in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, an EyeLink 1000 Desktop Mount camera system 
(SR Research, Ottawa, Canada), calibrated before each block, tracked the gaze position of the right eye dur-
ing the whole block.
The stimuli consisted of a large square (350 × 350 pixels) and a word in white lowercase font (Courier 16 
point) on a black background (Figure 1). The stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen. We created 
a list of 50 four-letter words (see Supplementary Materials), which could refer to natural or human-made 
objects. The experiment consisted of three parts, with five blocks per part. Each word was presented twice 
per block (1x with and 1x without distractors). There were three different word types: 80%-stop words (10 
words; on 80% of the trials, a stop signal was presented); 20%-stop words (30 words; on 20% of the trials, a 
stop signal was presented); and 0%-stop words (10 words; these words could only occur on no-signal trials). 
There were more 20%-stop words than 80%-stop words to keep the overall probability of stop-signal trials 
low (0.28; see also Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). Words were counterbalanced over conditions between 
participants. 
Procedure. On each trial, the square and a fixation signal were presented in the middle of the screen. 
After 250 ms, the word replaced the fixation signal in the centre of the square. Half of the participants 
pressed the ‘c’ key (with their left index finger) when the word referred to a natural object, and the ‘m’ key 
Best et al: Instructed and Acquired Contingencies Art. 4, page 7 of 23
(with their right index finger) when the word referred to a human-made object. This mapping was reversed 
for the other participants. On 50% of the trials, twenty two-letter randomly generated uppercase strings 
appeared in random locations within the square (distractor trials; Figure 1). To avoid overlap between these 
distractors and the word, the centre of the distractors was outside a smaller central region (100 × 50 pixels). 
New distractors were presented in different locations every 100ms throughout the duration of the trial. 
Participants had to ignore the distractors. 
On stop-signal trials, the outer square turned bold (1 to 3 pixels) after a variable SSD, instructing partici-
pants to withhold their response. The stop signal occurred equally often on distractor and on non-distractor 
trials. The SSD for 20%-stop words was initially set at 500 ms and was continuously adjusted to obtain a 
probability of successful stopping of 0.50: the SSD decreased by 50 ms following an unsuccessful stop-signal 
trial, but increased by 50 ms following a successful stop. We used two separate one-up/one-down tracking 
procedures for distractor and no-distractor trials. The SSD for the 80%-stop words was yoked to the SSD for 
the corresponding 20%-stop words. 
After the response deadline elapsed (1250 ms in Experiment 1; 2000 ms in Experiment 2) we presented 
feedback (on no-signal trials: ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, or ‘not quick enough’ in case the participant did not 
respond before the end of the trial; on stop-signal trials: ‘correct stop’ or ‘failed stop’), which remained on 
the screen for 500 ms. The feedback was presented to encourage fast and accurate responding. The next trial 
started immediately after the feedback. 
Stimulus-stop contingency knowledge was manipulated between-subjects. Participants in the instructed 
condition were presented with a 10-item list of the 80%-stop words on the screen at the beginning of 
each block and were instructed ‘For certain words, the lines of the surrounding square will become thicker 
(indicating that you have to withhold your response) more often than for other words. These words are listed 
below’. The stimulus-stop contingencies remained the same throughout the whole experiment so the 
same list was presented at the beginning of each block. No information about the 20%-stop and 0%-stop 
words was provided. At the beginning of each block, participants were instructed to remember as many 
of the words as possible. Once participants had done so, they pressed the ‘s’ key to move on to the next 
screen. There was no deadline on the word list screens. Participants in the uninstructed condition were 
not provided with any information about the stimulus-stop contingencies at the beginning of the blocks; 
the instruction screen simply said that they had to press the ‘s’ key to start the first trial. At the end of 
each block, we presented as feedback to the participants in both groups their mean RT on no-signal trials, 
the number of no-signal errors, the number of missed no-signal responses, and the percentage of failed 
stops.
Following completion of the experimental task, each word was again presented. The order of the words 
was randomised anew for each participant. Participants were asked to rate ‘how much do you expect to 
withhold your response when this word is presented?’ on a scale between 1 (‘I definitely do not think this 
word indicates that I have to withhold my response’) and 9 (‘I definitely think this word indicates that I have to 
withhold my response’). There was no response deadline for the expectancy ratings. 
Analyses. All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R Development Core Team, 2014). All 
data files and R scripts are deposited in the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/kydw6/?view_only=13
1cbcc73fce4abfbfc34375819ecaad).
To determine how learning and the presentation of the distractors influenced go performance, we analysed 
mean RT of correct no-signal trials. We also analysed the proportion of missed no-signal trials as a measure of 
outright stopping and/or extreme slowing (missed/(correct+incorrect+missed)). The proportion of incorrect 
trials ((incorrect/(correct+incorrect)); see Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b) was only analysed for completeness, 
as we did not have any strong predictions about how learning or the distractors could influence error rates 
(e.g. in learning did not affect error rates much in Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b; similarly, distractors did 
not influence error rates much in Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). To determine if learning influenced 
stopping performance, we analysed the probability of responding on stop-signal trials (p(respond|signal)) as 
the same SSD was used for 20%- and 80%-stop words (see also Best et al., 2016; Bowditch, Verbruggen, et 
al., 2016; Noël, Brevers, et al., 2016). 
Performance was analysed with ANOVAs as a function of part (part: 1 = blocks 1–5; 2 = blocks 6–10; 
3 = blocks 11–15), word type (80%-, 20%-, 0%-stop words), distractor type (distractor, no distractor), and 
instruction condition (instructed, uninstructed). As there were a high number of (possible) tests in the 
ANOVAs, we corrected the alpha level using the sequential Bonferroni procedure to correct for multiplicity 
(Cramer, et al., 2016). Where appropriate, we applied the Huyhn-Feldt correction for violations of sphericity. 
For pairwise comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the reported effect size measure (Lakens, 2013). 
Best et al: Instructed and Acquired ContingenciesArt. 4, page 8 of 23
For the no-signal RT analyses, we calculated Bayes factors for all main effects and interaction contrasts in 
the ANOVA design (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012). We calculated these with the BayesFactor 
package in R, using the default prior (0.707; Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2015). We used a top-down approach 
to reduce the number of model comparisons. Top-down model comparisons investigate the effect of remov-
ing each fixed factor and interaction from the overall model, such that the removal of meaningful factors or 
interactions will have a deleterious effect on the model fit whereas the removal of non-meaningful factors 
or interactions will not.
Descriptive statistics appear in Figures 2–5. Inferential statistics appear in Tables 1–3. Exploratory 
analyses of the eye-movement data of Experiment 1 and the behavioural analyses for each experiment 
separately are presented in the Supplementary Materials.
Results
No-signal analyses
Reaction times on correct no-signal trials. Figure 2 shows correct RTs on no-signal trials for each con-
dition, word type, distractor type, and part. Consistent with our predictions, we found a main effect of 
word type (p < 0.001; Table 1), and an interaction between condition and word type (p < 0.001; Table 1): 
Figure 2: Reaction times on correct no-signal trials for the instructed condition (left panels) and for the 
uninstructed condition (right panels) as a function of part (1–3), word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop or 
80%-stop words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 1: Overview of the ANOVA conducted on the no-signal trial data. Condition is included as a 
between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. In the no-signal trial RT analysis, incorrect, 
and missed no-signal trials were removed. 






F p αadj gen. η
2
No-signal trials: RT
Condition 1 118 171051.50 94794587.10 0.21 0.645 0.017 0.002
Part 2 236 1783555.0 13010265.90 16.18 <0.001 0.004 0.016
Type 2 236 904922.00 966318.40 110.50 <0.001 0.004 0.008
Distract 1 118 1309571.0 896684.60 172.33 <0.001 0.003 0.011
Condition by part 2 236 64644.43 13010265.90 0.59 0.492 0.013 0.001
Condition by type 2 236 246795.90 966318.40 30.14 <0.001 0.004 0.002
Condition by distract 1 118 9326.65 896684.60 1.23 0.270 0.006 <0.001
Part by type 4 472 41534.56 1219546.70 4.02 0.011 0.005 <0.001
Part by distract 2 236 7617.38 664742.90 1.35 0.261 0.006 <0.001
Type by distract 2 236 3299.20 387996.50 1.00 0.349 0.007 <0.001
Condition by part by type 4 472 28190.83 1219546.70 2.73 0.052 0.005 <0.001
Condition by part by distract 2 236 812.94 664742.90 0.14 0.857 0.050 <0.001
Condition by type by distract 2 236 2398.44 387996.50 0.73 0.447 0.010 <0.001
Part by type by distract 4 472 7405.20 1006301.70 0.87 0.443 0.008 <0.001
Condition by part by type by 
distract
4 472 3603.93 1006301.70 0.42 0.705 0.025 <0.001
No-signal trials: p(miss) 
Condition 1 118 0.00 2.56 0.13 0.724 0.017 <0.001
Part 2 236 0.02 1.09 2.38 0.098 0.005 0.003
Type 2 236 0.10 0.66 18.03 <0.001 0.003 0.015
Distract 1 118 0.03 0.23 16.71 <0.001 0.004 0.005
Condition by part 2 236 0.02 1.09 2.02 0.138 0.006 0.003
Condition by type 2 236 0.07 0.66 11.92 <0.001 0.004 0.010
Condition by distract 1 118 0.00 0.23 0.03 0.869 0.050 <0.001
Part by type 4 472 0.02 1.07 1.89 0.146 0.006 0.003
Part by distract 2 236 0.00 0.28 1.22 0.296 0.008 <0.001
Type by distract 2 236 0.00 0.37 0.14 0.760 0.025 <0.001
Condition by part by type 4 472 0.01 1.07 0.83 0.453 0.010 0.001
Condition by part by distract 2 236 0.01 0.28 3.34 0.039 0.005 0.001
Condition by type by distract 2 236 0.02 0.37 6.54 0.007 0.004 0.003
Part by type by distract 4 472 0.00 0.55 0.59 0.585 0.013 <0.001
Condition by part by type by 
distract
4 472 0.01 0.55 1.37 0.254 0.007 0.001
No-signal trials: p(error)
Condition 1 118 0.07 8.00 0.99 0.321 0.013 0.004
Part 2 236 0.10 1.13 9.95 <0.001 0.004 0.006
Type 2 236 0.23 1.38 19.83 <0.001 0.003 0.015
Distract 1 118 0.04 0.40 10.57 0.001 0.004 0.002
Condition by part 2 236 0.01 1.13 0.69 0.499 0.025 <0.001
Condition by type 2 236 0.10 1.38 8.39 0.002 0.004 0.007
Condition by distract 1 118 0.00 0.40 0.34 0.562 0.050 <0.001
(contd.)
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the word-type effect was more pronounced in the instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition 
 (Figure 2). Follow-up tests revealed that, as predicted, RTs on no-signal trials in the instructed condition 
were longer for the 80%-stop words (933 ms) than for the 0%-stop words (863 ms), t(59) = 10.17, p < 0.001, 
gav = 0.34, BF10 = 519120863260 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001),
3 and for the 20%-stop words (874 
ms), t(59) = 9.34, p < 0.001, gav = 0.29, BF10 = 25543245982 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001). The 
difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words was also reliable, t(59) = –5.10, p < 0.001, 
gav = –0.05, BF10 = 4510.62 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001). In the uninstructed condition, RTs on 
no-signal trials were longer for the 80%-stop words (921 ms) than for the 0%-stop words (900 ms), t(59) 
= 4.87, p < 0.001, gav = 0.10, BF10 = 2095.25 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001), and for the 20%-stop 
words (902 ms), t(59) = 4.71, p < 0.001, gav = 0.09, BF10 = 1197.50 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001). The 
difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words was not reliable, t(59) = –1.14, p = 0.261, gav 
= –0.01 (one-tailed directional t-test: p = 0.130), BF10 = 0.26.
4 The correlations between the slowing for the 
80%-stop words and the expectancy ratings in the instructed and uninstructed conditions will be discussed 
below (see ‘Expectancy analyses’).
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, the slowing for the 80%-stop words become numerically larger across 
task practice in both the instructed and uninstructed conditions indicating that learning took place in both 
conditions. Note, however, that the two-way interaction between word type and part and the three-way 
interaction between word type, part and condition did not survive correction for multiplicity.
Consistent with the earlier Verbruggen, Stevens et al. (2014) study, we found a main effect of distractor 
type (p < 0.001; Table 1). Importantly, however, there was no reliable difference in the magnitude of the dis-
tractor effect between conditions (p = 0.270; Table 1). Crucially, there was no reliable two-way interaction 
between word type and distractor type (p = 0.349; Table 1), nor a reliable three-way interaction between 
condition, word type, and distractor type (p = 0.447; Table 1). These conclusions were further supported by 
the Bayesian analyses. As can be seen in Table 2, the results of the Bayesian analyses are largely consistent 
with the ANOVAs reported in Table 1. The Bayesian analyses showed that dropping word type, distractor 
type, part, and the two-way interaction between condition and word type had a deleterious effect on the 
model fit. Importantly, the two-way interaction between word type and distractor type and the three-way 
 3 Based on previous evidence of stimulus-stop learning, we made strong predictions about the direction of this effect. No differences 
between word types or differences in the opposite direction (i.e. shorter RTs or lower p(miss) for 80% words than for 0%-stop 
and 20%-stop words) would argue against stimulus-stop associations. Therefore, we report both the two-tailed p-values and the 
p-values of one-directional t-tests. 
 4 To explore the difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words we repeated the main analysis excluding the 80%-
stop words. This showed that the two-way interaction between condition and word type was reliable, F(1, 118) = 7.12, p = 0.009, 
gen. η2 < 0.001, reflecting the larger RT differences between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words in the instructed condi-
tion than in the uninstructed condition. Furthermore, the three way interaction between condition, word type and part was also 
reliable, F(2, 236) = 3.07, p = 0.047, gen. η2 < 0.001: the numerical difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop 
words became larger as a function of part in the instructed condition but became smaller as a function of part in the uninstructed 
 condition. 






F p αadj gen. η
2
Part by type 4 472 0.02 1.43 1.55 0.204 0.007 0.001
Part by distract 2 236 0.01 0.70 1.35 0.260 0.010 0.001
Type by distract 2 236 0.04 0.64 7.35 0.003 0.005 0.003
Condition by part by type 4 472 0.01 1.43 0.94 0.417 0.017 0.001
Condition by part by distract 2 236 0.04 0.70 6.33 0.002 0.005 0.003
Condition by type by distract 2 236 0.01 0.64 1.35 0.257 0.008 <0.001
Part by type by distract 4 472 0.04 1.24 3.56 0.019 0.006 0.002
Condition by part by type by 
distract
4 472 0.03 1.24 3.18 0.030 0.006 0.002
Note: distract = distractor type; type = word type. αad = alpha-level following the sequential  Bonferroni procedure to 
control for multiplicity. ps < αadj are highlighted in bold.
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interaction between condition, word type, and distractor type could be dropped. These analyses provide 
further support for the conclusion that the distractor effect was similar across the word types. 
Probability of a missed go response. Figure 3 shows the p(miss) data. We found a main effect of word type 
(p < 0.001; Table 1) and a reliable two-way interaction between condition and word type (p < 0.001; Table 1). 
Follow up tests revealed that there was a main effect of word type in the instructed condition (p < 0.001): 
p(miss) in the instructed condition was higher for the 80%-stop words (0.051) than for the 0%-stop words 
(0.026), t(59) = 4.43, p < 0.001, gav = 0.58, BF10 = 493.45 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001), and for 
the 20%-stop words (0.025), t(59) = 4.43, p < 0.001, gav = 0.61, BF10 = 495.29 (one-tailed directional t-test: 
p < 0.001). There was no reliable main effect of word type in the uninstructed condition (p = 0.224). 
P(miss) was higher on distractor trials than on no-distractor trials (p < 0.001; Table 1). However, the 
two-way interaction between word type and distractor type was not reliable (p = 0.760; Table 1) and the 
three-way interaction between condition, word type, and distractor type did not survive after correction for 
multiplicity (p = 0.007; Table 1).
Combined, these results suggest that the instructed stimulus-stop associations increased outright stop-
ping (or induced extreme slowing) following the presentation of 80%-stop words even when a go response 
was required. However, there was no evidence that the distractor effect varied across word types, thus repli-
cating the results for RTs on no-signal trials. 
Probability of an incorrect go response. Figure 4 shows the p(error) data. Exploratory analyses of the 
p(error) data revealed a reliable main effect of word type (p < 0.001; Table 1) and a reliable two-way interac-
tion between condition and word type (p < 0.001; Table 1). Follow-up tests revealed that the main effect 
of word type was reliable in the instructed condition (p < 0.001): error rates were higher for the 80%-stop 
words (0.11) than for the 0%-stop words (0.07), t(59) = 4.73, p < 0.001, gav = 0.53, BF10 = 1289.83, and for 
the 20%-stop words (0.07), t(59) = 4.88, p < 0.001, gav = 0.51, BF10 = 2113.55. There was no reliable differ-
ence between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words, t(59) = –0.44, p = 0.661, gav = –0.03, BF10 = 0.15. 
There was a similar numerical trend in the uninstructed condition (Figure 4, right panel), but there was 
no reliable main effect of word type (all p = 0.204) so pairwise comparisons between word types were not 
conducted.
Table 2: No-signal trial RT Bayesian analysis. Bayes factors < 1 indicate that the removal of the factor or 
interaction had a deleterious effect on the model, whereas Bayes factors > 1 indicate that the factor or 
interaction could be removed without impairing the fit much. Note that ‘participant’ was included as a fac-
tor for all models, but this factor is not added to the model descriptions in the tables to reduce the amount 
of text. distract = distractor type; type = word type.






Condition by type 0.01 ±98.86%
Condition 6.76 ±65.95%
Condition by part 68.63 ±103.7%
Condition by distract by part by type 268.60 ±57.32%
Condition by distract by type 387.73 ±91.84%
Condition by distract 702.78 ±108.94%
Distract by part by type 796.09 ±63.71%
Part by type 878.80 ±88.37%
Distract by type 901.37 ±88.94%
Condition by part by type 4387.12 ±79.46%
Distract by part 4814.11 ±97.42%
Condition by distract by part 88222.89 ±108.29%
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There was a small but statistically significant difference between the no-distractor trials and the distractor 
trials (p = 0.001; Table 1). This effect did not interact with condition. The three-way interaction between 
word type, condition, and distractor was also not significant. 
Signal analyses. Analyses of the probability of responding on stop-signal trials revealed, as predicted, 
a main effect of word type (20%-stop vs. 80%-stop words), p < 0.001 (Figure 5; Table 3). There was also 
a reliable two-way interaction between condition and word type (p < 0.001; Table 3) reflecting the larger 
difference between the 80%-stop words and the 20%-stop words in the instructed condition than in the 
uninstructed condition (Figure 5). Follow-up tests revealed that p(respond|signal) was lower for the 80%-
stop words than for the 20%-stop words in the instructed condition (80%-stop words: 0.36, 20%-stop words: 
0.47; t(59) = –9.86, p < 0.001, gav = –1.41, BF10 = 170072648038) and in the uninstructed condition (80%-
stop words: 0.43, 20%-stop words: 0.46; t(59) = –3.55, p = 0.001, gav = –0.57, BF10 = 34.31). Thus, consistent 
with our hypothesis, stopping benefited from the stimulus-stop associations in the instructed and unin-
structed conditions. Furthermore, the SSD values were similar for the 80%-stop and 20%-stop words (for 
Figure 3: The probability of missed go responses for the instructed condition (left panels) and for the unin-
structed condition (right panels) as a function of part (1–3), word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop or 80%-stop 
words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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descriptive statistics, see Supplementary Materials) due to the yoked tracking procedure (for details see 
Procedure). Thus, the difference in p(respond|signal) was not due to differences in the SSD. 
Despite the separate tracking procedures, p(respond|signal) was lower on no-distractor trials than on dis-
tractor trials (p < 0.001; Table 3). This is consistent with our previous study which showed that distractors 
had a large effect on reactive inhibition (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). Importantly, there was no reliable 
two-way interaction between word type and distractor type (interaction effect: p = 0.947, Table 3), and fol-
low-up tests showed that the presence of distractors increased p(respond|signal) in the instructed condition 
(no-distractor: 0.40, distractor: 0.43; t(59) = 3.49, p = 0.001, gav = 0.31, BF10 = 29.10) and in the uninstructed 
condition (no-distractor: 0.43, distractor: 0.46; t(59) = 3.52, p = 0.001, gav = 0.45, BF10 = 31.45). The two-way 
interaction between part and distractor type was reliable (p < 0.001; Table 3); presumably, the separate 
tracking procedures were slowly ‘catching up’, reducing the distractor difference over blocks.
Expectancy analyses. Analyses of the expectancy data revealed a main effect of word type, F(2, 236) = 
142.24, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.329 (Figure 6). There was also a reliable interaction between word type and 
Figure 4: The probability of incorrect go responses for the instructed condition (left panels) and for the 
uninstructed condition (right panels) as a function of part (1–3), word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop or 80%-
stop words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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condition, F(2, 236) = 65.15, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.183, indicating that the differences between the word 
types were larger in the instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition. 
Consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies, planned comparisons revealed that participants in the 
instructed condition expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words than for the 0%-stop words, t(59) = 
–12.98, p < 0.001, gav = 2.62, BF10 = 8.67e+15, and for the 20%-stop words, t(59) = –11.27, p < 0.001, gav 
= 2.35, BF10 = 2.56e + 13 (Figure 6).
5 This is consistent with our hypothesis. The difference between the 
0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words in the instructed condition was also reliable, t(59) = –5.47, p < 0.001, 
gav = –0.46, BF10 = 16531.78, mirroring a similar difference in the task performance data for RTs and errors 
on no-signal trials. In other words, extra learning occurred in the instructed condition. It is possible that 
informing participants in the instructed condition about the 80%-stop words influenced both the strength 
 5 In the Instructed condition, 97% of participants expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words than for the 0%-stop words and 
90% of participants expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words than for the 20%-stop words (90% expected to stop more for 
the 80%-stop items than the 0%-stop and 20%-stop words). 
Figure 5: The probability of responding on stop-signal trials for the instructed condition (left panels) and 
for the uninstructed condition (right panels) as a function of part (1–3), word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop or 
80%-stop words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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and/or quality of their knowledge representations regarding the existence of stimulus-stop contingencies in 
the task. Participants in the uninstructed condition also expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words than 
for the 0%-stop words, t(59) = –4.26, p < 0.001, gav = 0.50, BF10 = 287.76, and for the 20%-stop words, t(59) 
= –4.01, p < 0.001, gav = 0.44, BF10 = 131.54.
6 The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop 
words in the uninstructed condition was not reliable, t(59) = –1.03, p = 0.307, gav = –0.09, BF10 = 0.23. Thus, 
participants in both conditions could distinguish between the 80%-stop words and the other word types on 
the basis of their association with stopping.
Next we investigated the relationship between the expectancy ratings and task performance (Figure 7). 
In the instructed condition, as predicted, the 80%-stop vs. 0%-stop expectancy difference reliably correlated 
with the corresponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.548, p < 0.001; similarly, the 80%-stop vs. 20%-stop expec-
tancy difference reliably correlated with the corresponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.524, p < 0.001. In the 
uninstructed condition, again as predicted, both correlations were not significant (rs ≤ –0.09, ps ≥ 0.501; 
note that uncorrected ps are reported). To investigate whether the correlations in the instructed and unin-
structed conditions were statistically different, we compared the correlation coefficients in the instructed 
and uninstructed conditions using the Fisher’s r-to-z transformation. This confirmed that the difference 
between the instructed and uninstructed conditions was reliable for the 80% vs. 0%-stop correlations (Z = 
3.59, p < 0.001) and for the 80% vs. 20%-stop correlations (Z = 3.58, p < 0.001). To quantify the evidence 
in favour of the null hypothesis (of no relationship) and of the alternative hypothesis (of a relationship), we 
also conducted Bayesian regression analyses. These analyses supported the null hypothesis that the expec-
tancy ratings did not correlate with the RT slowing in the uninstructed condition (BF 80%-stop vs. 0%-stop 
words: 0.28; BF 80%-stop vs. 20%-stop words: 0.32), whereas the same analyses supported the alternative 
hypothesis for the instructed analysis (BF 80%-stop vs. 0%-stop words: 2701.52; BF 80%-stop vs. 20%-stop 
words: 1023.85). 
 6 In the uninstructed condition, 67% of participants expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words than for the 0%-stop words and 
70% of participants expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words than for the 20%-stop words (48% expected to stop more for 
the 80%-stop items than the 0%-stop and 20%-stop words). 
Table 3: Overview of the ANOVA conducted on the stop-signal data. Condition is included as a between-
subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. 






F p αadj gen. η
2
Main analysis
Condition 1 118 0.36 5.35 7.94 0.006 0.006 0.019
Part 2 236 1.04 4.51 27.13 <0.001 0.004 0.053
Type 1 118 1.95 2.27 101.58 <0.001 0.003 0.095
Distract 1 118 0.21 0.99 24.50 <0.001 0.005 0.011
Condition by part 2 236 0.09 4.51 2.31 0.109 0.008 0.005
Condition by type 1 118 0.68 2.27 35.21 <0.001 0.004 0.035
Condition by distract 1 118 0.00 0.99 0.07 0.792 0.013 <0.001
Part by type 2 236 0.12 1.85 7.59 0.001 0.005 0.006
Part by distract 2 236 0.22 1.60 16.03 <0.001 0.004 0.012
Type by distract 1 118 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.947 0.050 <0.001
Condition by part by type 2 236 0.00 1.85 0.20 0.834 0.017 <0.001
Condition by part by distract 2 236 0.00 1.60 0.17 0.840 0.025 <0.001
Condition by type by distract 1 118 0.00 0.73 0.55 0.459 0.010 <0.001
Part by type by distract 2 236 0.03 1.36 2.26 0.106 0.007 0.001
Condition by part by type by 
distract
2 236 0.04 1.36 3.15 0.045 0.006 0.002
Note: distract = distractor type; type = word type. αad = alpha-level following the sequential Bonferroni procedure to 
control for multiplicity. ps < αadj are highlighted in bold.
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Inspection of Figure 7 shows that the difference between these correlations is unlikely to be entirely due 
to differences in the range of the RT and/or expectancy values between the instructed and uninstructed 
conditions. However, to test this possibility further, we excluded RT-difference scores (and corresponding 
expectancy-difference scores) in the instructed condition that were less than or greater than the lowest and 
highest RT difference scores, respectively, in the uninstructed condition. There were 44 participants remain-
ing for the 80%-stop vs. 0%-stop correlation and 46 participants for the 80%-stop vs. 20%-stop correlation. 
Nevertheless, the observed correlations in the instructed condition remained reliable and the Bayes Factors 
Figure 7: Expectancy/RT correlations for the 80%-stop and 0%-stop words (upper panels) and the 80%-stop 
and 20%-stop words (lower panels) for the instructed condition (left panels) and for the uninstructed 
condition (right panels). The correlations in the instructed condition were reliable (ps ≤ 0.001) but the 
correlations in the uninstructed condition were not reliable (ps ≥ 0.501).
Figure 6: Expectancy ratings for the instructed condition (left panels) and for the uninstructed condition 
(right panels) as a function of word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop or 80%-stop words). Note: 1 = ‘I definitely do 
not think this word indicates that I have to withhold my response’; 9 = ‘I definitely think this word indicates 
that I have to withhold my response’. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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showed substantial support for the alternative hypothesis (rs ≥ 0.385, ps ≤ 0.010, BFs ≥ 4.99). Furthermore, 
this difference cannot be easily explained by the differences in the acquisition rates of the stimulus-stop 
contingencies between the instructed and uninstructed conditions; RT/expectancy correlations performed 
on only part 3 (i.e. the final part of training) showed a similar pattern as the aforementioned correlations 
with all parts of training included. In the instructed condition, we found that the 80%-stop vs. 0%-stop 
expectancy difference reliably correlated with the corresponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.419, p < 0.001; 
similarly, the 80%-stop vs. 20%-stop expectancy difference reliably correlated with the corresponding RT 
difference, r(58) = 0.341, p = 0.008. In the uninstructed condition, all correlations were not significant (ps ≥ 
0.223). Thus, it seems that although the behavioural effects are the same (i.e. response slowing for 80%-stop 
words), there is good evidence that the underlying mechanisms are somewhat different for the instructed 
and uninstructed conditions. 
General Discussion
Responding is typically slowed for items that were previously associated with stopping. This slowing has 
been attributed to the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations which ‘directly’ activate the stop goal/response 
and slow responding on no-signal trials. Thus, learning could reduce the need for reactive and instruction-
based control in response-inhibition tasks as the stop process could be activated before an extra signal is 
presented (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). However, in some recent experi-
ments we found that slowing for old stop words was mediated by expectancies of the stimulus-stop contin-
gencies acquired during training (Best et al., 2016). Previous work has demonstrated that when an instruc-
tional cue [e.g. ‘p(stop-signal) = .75’] indicates that a stop signal is likely to occur on the following trial(s), 
participants slow down by proactively adjusting their processing strategies (for reviews, see e.g. Aron, 2011; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2017). Therefore, if participants use stop-associated items as similar cues, slowing for 
old stop-associated words could reflect proactive (anticipatory) strategy adjustments driven by expectancies 
of the stimulus-stop contingencies in play rather than some more direct activation of the stop process. In 
the present study we aimed to test this hypothesis using a combination of an instruction and distractor 
manipulation. We also measured expectancy ratings following task completion (as in our previous study; 
Best et al., 2016). 
Similarities between the instructed and uninstructed conditions
Consistent with our predictions, our results show that the stimulus-stop contingencies influenced task 
performance in both the instructed and the uninstructed conditions: RTs on no-signal trials were higher 
and the p(respond|signal) was lower for the stop-associated words (80%-stop) than for the go-associated 
(0%-stop) words and for the control (20%-stop) words. Consistent with our instruction manipulation and 
predictions, the effects of word type on performance were greater in the instructed condition (where 
participants were told beforehand which words would likely be associated with a stop signal) than in 
the uninstructed condition (where participants received no such information). This difference remained 
relatively stable over time, as indicated by the absence of a three-way interaction between part, word type, 
and condition. 
Participants in both conditions also generated expectancies that were consistent with the stimulus-stop 
contingencies in play: they expected to stop their responses more when stop-associated words were pre-
sented than when go-associated or control words were presented. 
Combined, these results suggest that stimulus-stop associations acquired primarily through explicit 
instructions and uninstructed stimulus-stop associations acquired primarily through task practice have 
similar effects on task performance (i.e. both induce slowing on no-signal trials and reduce the probability 
of responding on stop-signal trials). However, the effects are much stronger when the stop contingencies 
are instructed.
The overlap between the instructed and uninstructed conditions is consistent with previous work that 
has demonstrated that key areas of the instruction-based inhibitory control network are activated follow-
ing the presentation of old stop-associated items (e.g. Lenartowicz et al., 2011). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that despite the differences in learning speed, similar learning mechanisms may underlie instruc-
tion- or rule-based behaviour and stimulus-response link based behaviour (e.g. Pfeuffer, Hosp, Kimmig, 
Moutsopoulou, Waszak, & Kiesel, 2017; Pfeuffer, Moutsopoulou, Pfister, Waszak, & Kiesel, 2017; Pfeuffer, 
Moutsopoulou, Waszak, & Kiesel, 2018; Ramamoorthy & Verguts, 2012; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). 
Given this overlap between instruction- and practice-based inhibition, it is perhaps unsurprising that we 
find similarities between the two instruction conditions in the present study. 
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Differences between the instructed and uninstructed conditions
Despite the overlap, it is noteworthy that extra practice did not reduce the difference between the two 
instruction conditions. Thus, the difference between the instructed and uninstructed condition may not be 
(only) due to slower learning rates in the latter. Indeed, we also found some other differences between the 
instructed and uninstructed conditions. In the instructed condition, participants were slower to respond to 
the 20%-stop words during task performance and expected to stop more to the 20%-stop words compared 
with the 0%-stop words. We found no reliable differences between the 20%-stop and 0%-stop words in the 
uninstructed condition. This suggests that instructing the participants about the 80%-stop words influ-
enced their meta-knowledge about the existence of stimulus-stop contingencies in the task and encouraged 
them to look for others (“I know there are words often paired with the stop-signal – it might be good to 
search for other structures in the task material as well”, cf. Gaschler et al., 2014), alongside influencing their 
knowledge about specific 80%-stop words (“I know that this word is often paired with stop”).
Furthermore, in the instructed condition, we found that the expectancy ratings correlated with task per-
formance: participants who expected to withhold their response more for the 80%-stop words responded 
more slowly to these words than to the 0%-stop words and to the 20%-stop words. In contrast, the expec-
tancy ratings in the uninstructed condition did not reliably correlate with task performance. This conclu-
sion was further supported by Bayesian regression analyses. In other words, participants could generate 
expectancies (at least at the end of the experiment), but these expectancies did not seem to influence task 
performance. 
In Best et al. (2016), we also found a correlation between slowing and expectancy ratings, even though 
all stimulus-stop mappings were uninstructed. As noted in the Introduction, correlations between expec-
tancy ratings and performance are consistent with the idea that slowing reflects strategic proactive control 
adjustments, whereas the absence of a correlation is more consistent with the idea that the retrieval of stop 
associations directly interferes with responding. Differences in task characteristics (e.g. in Best et al., we used 
a hybrid go/no-go task whereas we used a stop-signal task in the present study) could have influenced what 
was learned and how the acquired associations influenced subsequent performance in our two studies. It is 
also possible, however, that expectancies simply constitute a measure of the strength of stimulus-stop learn-
ing on performance, in which case the difference between studies is quantitive (i.e. the amount of learning) 
rather than qualitative (strategy adjustments vs. direct activation). 
It is also important to note that the association between expectancies and task performance was correla-
tional and not causal. To establish a causal role of explicit expectancies and to further disentangle contribu-
tions of expectancies and learning in response-inhibition tasks, future research could, for example, instruct 
expectations that do not fully match with the contingencies in the task material (Biele, Rieskamp, Gonzalez, 
2009; Doll, Jakobs, Sanfey, Frank, 2009; Umbach, Schwager, Frensch, & Gaschler, 2012).
No interactions with the distractor effect
In Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), expectancy was manipulated in a block-based fashion (i.e. partici-
pants were informed at the beginning of a block if signals could occur in the periphery or in the centre 
of the screen), and strategic proactive control adjustments increased the distractor effect in RTs on no-
signal trials. We used the same distractor manipulation in the present study to distinguish the roles of 
strategic proactive control and direct retrieval (of the stimulus-stop associations) in a stop-learning task. 
Consistent with Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), we predicted that participants in instructed condition 
would proactively adjust their attention when presented with 80%-stop words; consequently, the distrac-
tor effect would be larger for the 80%-stop words compared with the other word types. Furthermore, if 
participants in the uninstructed condition similarly used the 80%-stop words as cues to elicit proactive 
attentional control, we would see a larger distractor effect for these words emerge over task practice in 
this condition as well. In contrast, the ‘direct retrieval’ account predicted no change in the distractor 
effect across word types (if anything, the effect could become smaller because there is less need to moni-
tor for stop signals if the word is highly predictive of a signal). Thus, we anticipated that the inclusion of 
the distractor manipulation would allow us to determine the involvement of strategic proactive control 
adjustments during stop learning. 
Contrary to our predictions, we found that word-specific stop learning did not interact with the distractor 
effect on no-signal RTs. Importantly, this was the case in both the instructed and uninstructed conditions 
(and in the uninstructed condition of an earlier pilot experiment; see Supplementary Materials). Here, we 
suggest three of the most plausible alternative explanations for the absence of an interaction between 
expectancy and the distractor manipulation in no-signal RTs. 
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First, it is possible that participants simply cannot adjust their attentional settings on a trial-by-trial 
basis (see Strayer & Kramer, 1994, for a similar idea). However, evidence in the task-switching literature has 
demonstrated that participants can reconfigure their attentional settings when a cue indicates that a task 
switch is required (e.g. Longman, Lavric, & Monsell, 2013; Longman, Lavric, Munteanu, & Monsell, 2014; 
Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre, 2005). Furthermore, trial-by-trial changes in attentional settings were 
also observed in the proactive inhibitory control study of Elchlepp et al. (2016). Combined, these findings 
indicate that trial-by-trial adjustments in attentional settings can indeed be made (see also Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009a). 
Second, it is possible that in the previous study by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), the presence of dis-
tractors primarily interfered with the detection or analysis of the go words rather than response selection. 
In the original experiment, two words were presented and participants had to respond to the location of 
the natural item, whereas only one word was presented in the present study. Thus, the attentional demands 
were higher in Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014).
Third, we should also consider the possibility that the increased distractor effect in non-central signal 
blocks reported by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014) reflects a ‘false positive’. After we failed to observe an 
increased distractor effect in the instructed condition of the present study, we ran a further (unpublished) 
experiment with two words per trial. There were ‘pure’ blocks in which the location of the signal stayed 
the same (non-central signal blocks, central signal blocks, and no-signal blocks as in Verbruggen, Stevens, 
et al. 2014) and ‘mixed’ blocks in which the location of the signal changed on a trial-by-trial basis. In both 
block types, the location of the upcoming signal was instructed by way of a cue presented at the beginning 
of each trial. We did not find any differences in the size of the distractor effect across the signal locations 
in the pure blocks or in the mixed blocks. One possibility is that the presentation of the cue on each trial 
encouraged participants to attend to the centre of the screen in that experiment. Alternatively, it could be 
that attentional adjustments, if made, do not reliably increase the distractor effect in this stop-signal task 
after all. 
We cannot currently distinguish between the different explanations, so future research is required 
here. Note that the present study found effects of distractors on reactive inhibition (as indexed by 
p(respond|signal)). We also replicated the distractor effect on reactive stopping in another recent study 
(Dodds et al., In Preparation). Thus, we consistently replicated the reactive inhibition part of the Verbruggen, 
Stevens, et al. (2014) findings. This difference between reactive and proactive inhibition is not surprising, 
as distractors had a much larger effect on reactive control than proactive control in the original study 
(Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). To detect attentional strategy adjustments, more sensitive measures 
might be needed (such as EEG; see Elchlepp et al., 2016; Schevernels et al., 2015). 
Conclusion
In conclusion, these results suggest that slowing for stimuli that are consistently associated with stopping 
can arise from both instructed and acquired mappings. Given that we found effects of the stimulus-stop 
contingencies on expectancies in both the instructed and uninstructed conditions, the most parsimonious 
explanation would be to argue that explicit knowledge is required to observe response slowing for old stop 
items. However, Bayesian analyses showed that expectancies correlated with response slowing on no-signal 
trials in the instructed condition but not in the uninstructed condition. Thus, the present study provides 
some evidence that stimulus-stop learning may well be mediated via both expectancies and information 
acquired via experience.
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